Chapter 9: Ontario’s BetGuard Is Progress. But It Cannot Be the Whole Strategy.

BetGuard launched on May 14, 2026, it is a centralized self-exclusion tool for the regulated online gambling market.

That matters.

For someone trying to stop gambling, a centralized block is better than being forced to self-exclude one operator at a time. When someone is already in crisis, the system should not make them manually close every door by themselves.

According to iGaming Ontario, BetGuard allows individuals 19 and older to voluntarily opt out of all Ontario-regulated online gaming platforms through one online portal. Once someone opts out, they are prevented from accessing existing accounts, creating new accounts, and receiving marketing communications from regulated Ontario igaming sites. (iGaming Ontario)

That is progress.

But progress is not the same thing as a complete strategy.

The question Ontario should be asking now is not simply, “Do we have a centralized self-exclusion tool?”

The question is:

What problem are we actually trying to solve?

Because if the problem is only access to regulated Ontario gambling sites, BetGuard is a logical response.

But if the problem is gambling addiction, relapse, offshore gambling, misleading payment pathways, affiliate promotion, crypto access, fake descriptors, and self-excluded players being pulled back into play, then BetGuard is only one piece.

And one piece is not enough.

The Missing Question: Where Does a Self-Excluded Player Go?

This is the question I keep coming back to.

Where does a self-excluded player go when they are still battling addiction?

Self-exclusion does not remove addiction. It creates a barrier.

That barrier matters. But a barrier only works if the system around it holds.

Ontario can create mandatory requirements for regulated operators. It can require responsible gambling controls. It can build a centralized self-exclusion tool. It can tell regulated operators to stop access and marketing once a player opts out.

All of that is important.

But the person experiencing gambling harm does not necessarily stay inside the regulated framework.

They search.

They click.

They find an offshore site.

They follow an affiliate link.

They watch a streamer.

They use crypto.

They deposit through a third-party payment route.

They see a transaction on their bank statement that does not clearly look like gambling.

And suddenly, the Ontario block that looked strong inside the regulated system is no longer enough.

This is not a criticism of BetGuard. It is a criticism of treating BetGuard as if it can solve a systems problem by itself.

Because if the regulated door closes but the offshore door remains wide open, the system is still incomplete.

Ontario Made an Okay Choice. But What Checks and Balances Were Put Around It?

BetGuard is not a bad choice. A centralized self-exclusion tool is better than the old operator-by-operator model.

But Ontario should be transparent about the process behind that choice.

What other tools were reviewed?

What other markets were studied?

Were international examples like the United Kingdom’s GAMSTOP or Australia’s BetStop considered?

Were blocking tools such as BetBlocker or Gamban considered as part of the broader harm-reduction conversation?

BetBlocker describes itself as a UK-registered charity offering free gambling-blocking support that can be installed across devices. (betblocker.org) Gamban describes its product as a blocking tool that uses a multi-layered approach to block gambling websites and apps worldwide. (Gamban) Australia’s BetStop is a national self-exclusion register that blocks access to licensed Australian online and phone gambling providers. (betstop.gov.au) In Great Britain, the Gambling Commission says GAMSTOP is an online multi-operator self-exclusion scheme, and all licensed gambling businesses must participate. (Gambling Commission)

That does not mean Ontario should copy any one model exactly.

But it does mean the public deserves to know what was compared, what was rejected, what was adopted, and what gaps remain.

Because a good tool still needs checks and balances.

What data will be collected?

How will effectiveness be measured?

What happens when someone tries to return to regulated play?

What happens when someone moves offshore?

How will failed blocks, attempted account creation, marketing suppression, and post-exclusion risk be tracked?

What public reporting will exist?

What role do banks, payment processors, treatment providers, families, and lived-experience advocates have in evaluating the system?

These are not technical details.

They are the difference between a tool and a strategy.

But My God, the Harm: What Are Ontario Watchdogs Warning About?

This is the part that cannot be softened.

Ontario’s regulated igaming market is not some tiny pilot project anymore. It launched in April 2022. It has now had years to generate revenue, refine systems, collect data, and understand risk.

And the market has grown fast.

iGaming Ontario reported that in 2024–25, the regulated market generated $82.7 billion in wagers and $2.9 billion in total gaming revenue, with continued high rates of regulated play. iGaming Ontario also stated that its mandate now includes economic development and revenue generation for the province.

So Ontario can tell us about the money.

But my God, what about the harm?

Because the watchdogs, researchers, and public-health voices are not silent here.

The Auditor General of Ontario warned before the market launched that iGaming Ontario’s structure created potential conflicts of interest and could compromise the AGCO’s independence as regulator. The Auditor General specifically identified an inherent conflict between iGaming Ontario’s goal of generating revenue for the province and the AGCO’s goal of effectively regulating the gaming sector.

That warning matters even more now.

Because when the province benefits from gambling revenue, the public needs confidence that harm is being measured, disclosed, and acted on with the same seriousness as revenue.

Public-health researchers are also raising the alarm. McMaster researchers have noted that Ontario has not announced funding for independent research to monitor the impact of online gambling expansion, even though signs point to rising problem gambling since iGaming Ontario’s introduction. They cite estimates suggesting problem gambling in Ontario may be far higher than older pre-market figures, along with a spike in calls to the Ontario Problem Gambling Helpline about online gambling.

Carleton researchers made the same basic point even more plainly: since iGaming Ontario launched, quarterly wagers have more than quadrupled, yet Ontario lacks reliable data on how this shift is affecting Ontarians. They also warn that the problem may be worse than we know because the province has not announced independent research funding to monitor the impact.

CMHA Ontario has called for stronger public-health measures, including banning gambling advertising, dedicating a portion of provincial igaming revenue to harm-reduction programs and research, prominently displaying gambling harms in communications, scaling up family and caregiver supports, and collecting and publishing demographic data on gambling and gambling-related problems.

Medical voices are also warning about youth exposure. A CMAJ article states that Ontario’s legalization of online gambling turned any smartphone into a betting platform, and that gambling advertising can influence young people to start gambling, gamble more, and make recovery from problem gambling more difficult.

So the concern is not imaginary.

The concern is not anti-gambling moral panic.

The concern is that Ontario built a high-speed revenue-generating gambling market before building an equally visible, equally transparent, equally serious harm-monitoring system around it.

That is highly problematic.

Because if the province can publish market performance, it can publish harm performance.

If it can track wagers, it can track self-exclusion.

If it can report gaming revenue, it can report relapse pathways.

If it can count operators, it can count complaints.

If it can measure market growth, it can measure whether people are being pushed offshore.

And if those numbers are not being collected, disclosed, or independently studied, then Ontario is asking the public to trust a system without showing us the full picture.

That is not good enough.

Not after years of regulation.

Not with billions in wagers.

Not when people’s lives, families, finances, mental health, and recovery are on the line.

Systems Thinking Has to Be Part of the Solution

A person does not relapse in a vacuum.

They relapse inside an environment that either makes stopping easier or makes continuing easier.

That is why systems thinking has to be part of the solution. It is not enough to say, “Look, we did something.” Sometimes the theatre of optics is exactly that: a system points to one intervention and says, “See, we helped.”

But the fact that something was done does not mean enough was done.

BetGuard may be progress. A centralized self-exclusion tool may be necessary. But necessary is not the same as sufficient.

If a self-excluded person can still find an offshore site, still register, still deposit, still be reached by affiliates or streamers, still use crypto or third-party payment pathways, and still see gambling transactions disguised on a bank statement, then the system around that person is still failing.

The environment around gambling harm includes regulated operators, offshore operators, advertising, affiliates, streamers, payment providers, banks, card networks, merchant descriptors, crypto platforms, KYC systems, treatment pathways, family supports, complaint systems, and enforcement capacity.

If Ontario only focuses on regulated operators, it misses the ecosystem around the player.

If Ontario only focuses on the player, it misses the infrastructure around the harm.

If Ontario only counts market growth, wagers, revenue, and active accounts, it misses the people falling through the gaps.

Systems thinking means asking what happens before, during, and after self-exclusion.

It means asking what the player sees.

What they can access.

Who is still marketing to them.

Who is still processing their deposits.

What the bank statement says.

What the family can understand.

What the regulator can see.

What data is missing.

And what happens when the person is no longer inside Ontario’s regulated market.

That is where the real policy conversation begins.

Because if the response to gambling harm is mainly, “We built a block,” then the next question has to be, “What happens when people go around it?”

And if nobody can answer that clearly, then we do not have a complete harm-reduction strategy.

We have a visible intervention.

We have an announcement.

We have optics.

But we do not yet have a system that understands the full system of harm.

What Other Markets Are Talking About

In the quest to understand what other markets are doing around the world, I recently came across an interview that I think is worth a look.

The interview is BetTalker Podcast, Season 2 Episode 2: João Mar on Gambling Addiction and the Black Market, hosted by Mr. Pedro Romero of BetBlocker, featuring Mr. João Mar of Deal Me Out / GAMERS.

The interview can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9qSaol7Wfe4&t=3714s

What I found interesting was not only the personal story. It was the systems analysis.

Mr. Mar speaks about gambling addiction, black-market gambling, offshore operators, self-exclusion, payment providers, affiliates, streamers, weak KYC, and the wider ecosystem that continues to reach vulnerable players even after they have tried to stop. In this piece he describes illegal gambling as a market that can continue reaching people who are already self-excluded, already vulnerable, or already in harm.

That framing matters for Ontario.

Because Ontario’s tools are good in terms of creating mandatory requirements inside the regulated system.

But the concern goes beyond the regulated system.

A regulated operator can be required to honour self-exclusion.

But what about an offshore operator?

A regulated operator can be required to stop direct marketing.

But what about affiliates, streamers, and review sites?

A regulated operator can be required to verify identity.

But what about a site that accepts weak or false information until withdrawal?

A regulated operator can be subject to Ontario standards.

But what about a payment route that makes a gambling transaction look like something else?

Mr. Mar also raises concerns about payment providers and black-market operators allegedly processing gambling deposits in misleading ways, including through non-gambling categories. He emphasizes that payment providers are a major part of why illegal casinos remain functional, because immediate access and instant deposits are central to the relapse pathway.

That is the part Ontario cannot ignore.

The Payment Chain Is Part of the Harm Landscape

If someone is self-excluded and still able to deposit offshore, the system has not protected them enough.

It may have protected the regulated operator.

It may have protected Ontario’s legal market.

But it did not protect the person.

That is why payment accountability matters.

We should be asking:

Who processed the transaction?

Was the merchant descriptor accurate?

Was the transaction coded as gambling?

Was the operator licensed to accept Ontario players?

Was the person already self-excluded?

Was the payment routed through a third party?

Was the transaction disguised?

Was there a pattern of high-risk deposits?

Could the bank, payment provider, acquirer, or card network have detected the risk?

These are not side questions.

These are prevention questions.

Because if the payment still works, the gambling still works.

Education Cannot Just Be a Poster on a Wall

Education is another piece of the system.

People need to know what BetGuard does.

They also need to know what it does not do.

They need to understand the difference between regulated Ontario sites and offshore sites.

They need to know that if a site accepts them after self-exclusion, that is a red flag.

They need to understand that misleading payment descriptors are not normal.

They need to understand that affiliates, streamers, and review sites can be part of the access pathway.

They need to understand what to do after relapse without being buried in shame.

Families need tools too.

Families often see the damage before they understand the ecosystem. They see missing money, secrecy, emotional collapse, debt, and bank statements that do not make sense. But they may not know what they are looking at.

Education has to be digestible.

Short videos.

Checklists.

Plain-language guides.

Payment-descriptor explainers.

Family resources.

A “what to do after a relapse” tool.

A visual map of how offshore gambling access works.

A clear explanation of where BetGuard helps and where it does not.

This is not about dumbing the issue down.

It is about making the issue usable.

BetGuard Is One Piece

BetGuard is progress.

It is a good and necessary tool.

But Ontario should not mistake a tool for a full harm-reduction strategy.

A full strategy would ask what happens to a self-excluded player after the regulated door closes.

A full strategy would look at offshore operators.

A full strategy would look at payment providers.

A full strategy would look at misleading descriptors.

A full strategy would track system-level outcomes.

A full strategy would make the data visible.

A full strategy would educate different audiences in different ways.

A full strategy would listen to people with lived experience.

A full strategy would understand that addiction does not stop at the border of the regulated market.

This is the part I think we have to say clearly:

Ontario may be building stronger tools inside the regulated market, but the offshore market is still part of the harm landscape.

If the person trying to stop can still find a site, register, deposit, and gamble instantly, then the system around that person is still failing.

BetGuard is one piece.

But the problem is bigger than one piece.

It is an ecosystem.

And if Ontario wants to meaningfully reduce gambling harm, it needs to start treating it like one.